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Preface 
Negotiations among nations are more likely to be successful 
in achieving mutually beneficial agreements when the parties 
demonstrate a degree of flexibility from their initial stance, 
when they show some willingness to compromise or yield in the 
direction of the other parties1 positions. Intransigence often 
results in negotiation failure. 
This study takes the findings of over 70 published 
bargaining experiments and compares them statistically to draw 
conclusions about the relative significance of eight variable 
categories that are hypothesized to influence the degree of 
negotiator flexibility. When the body of experimental literature 
is compared in this integrative fashion, some conclusions are 
revealed that challenge the assumptions and findings of 
individual studies. 
This analysis contributes to the Processes of International 
Negotiation (PIN) Project Working Group on Negotiation 
Flexibility. It suggests constructive paths for future 
experimental research. Much of the analysis was conducted while 
the author was a Visiting Research Scholar at the PIN Project 
during the Summer 1992. 
Abstract 
Effects of eight variables on yielding behavior and time to resolution were 
evaluated by a meta-analysis of published bargaining experiments reported over 
a twenty-five year period. The strongest effect sizes were obtained for the 
variables of prenegotiation experience, negotiator's orientation, initial 
position distance, and time pressure. Weak effect sizes were shown for large 
versus small issues, representation, and visibility of the bargaining process. 
These results challenge the assertion made by Blake and Mouton (1989) that group 
representation is the most important determinant of competitive behavior in 
bargaining. Analyses of differences in procedures used in the strongest and 
weakest effect-size studies in each category suggest a number of conditions 
under which bargainers are likely to be intransigent. Comparison of the meta- 
analysis results with those obtained from a simulation where similar variables 
were combined in scenarios revealed stronger effect sizes for the combined 
'variables both across and within stages of the simulation. Further analyses 
would elucidate effects of other independent and dependent variables as these 
are explored in future experimentation. 
Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation: A Meta-Analvsis 
A large number of experimental studies on bargaining behavior have been 
reported since the early 1960s. Many of these studies explore relationships 
among variables hypothesized to influence a bargainer's willingness to make 
concessions or to yield from initial positions. Each of several situational 
variables has been analyzed in a number of studies making it possible to compare 
results. With the advent of meta-analytic statistical techniques, it is now 
possible also to compare results obtained for different independent variables 
construed as aspects of the bargaining situation. The purpose of this study is 
to assess the relative impacts of several variables, emphasized in this 
literature, on compromising behavior. 
Recently, Blake and Mouton (1989) presented a compendium of results of 
experimental research on interpersonal and intergroup conflict. Based on these 
findings , they concluded that the critical lesson to be learned is that " (b)eing 
a member of a group exerts a vast influence, albeit a more or less silent one, 
on how individuals behave" (p. 139). This interpretation reinforces their 
earlier conclusion based on the results of experiments reported in the early 
1960s (e.g., Blake and Mouton, 1961a, 1961b, 1961c, 1962). It is a single- 
factor explanation for the observedbehavior of members representing their groups 
in competitive situations, namely, that their competitive, non-compromising 
behavior is due to loyalty to the group that they represent. However, the 
evidence can be interpreted in a different way. Rather than ascribing the 
findings to a single factor, it would seem that a number of situational 
variables, including group loyalty, contribute to the competitive behavior of 
group representatives: Some of these variables were confounded with the 
representational variable in the Blake and Mouton studies, making it difficult 
to assert that representation per se accounts for the findings (see Druckman, 
1967). Examples of possibly-confounded variables are the way that 
representatives prepare for a negotiation (Druckman, 1967,1968; Bass, 1966; 
Klimoski, 1972), the structure of the problem as all-or-none or distributive 
(Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973), the representative's attitudinal-orientation 
toward the negotiation (Druckman, 1967), and types of constituent communications 
to the representative during negotiations (Organ, 1971; Benton and Druckman, 
1974). Each of these variables has been shown to have a significant effect on 
negotiating behavior. Other variables in the Blake and Mouton inventory shown 
to affect negotiating behavior, independent of group representation, are the 
visibility of the talks (Brown, 1970; Pruitt et al., 1986), the other's 
bargaining strategy (Yukl, 1974; Druckman and Bonoma, 1976; Gruder, 1971), the 
size of the conflict (Rappoport, 1969; Love et al., 1983), and time pressure 
(Carnevale and Lawler, 1986; Smith et al., 1982). These results would seem to 
argue against single-factor explanations for the observed negotiating behavior 
of group representatives. It is more likely that many aspects of the situation 
contribute to the behavior of interest, either as weighted or interacting 
components. Analyses reported to date do not elucidate the relative importance 
of these factors. 
Missing from the Blake and Mouton review, and from many similar summaries 
of this literature (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Druckman and Hopmann, 1989; Wall, 1992), 
is information about the number of studies in which these relationships were 
obtained, the strength of the relationships, and the way that the independent 
and dependent variables were defined from one study to another. The literature 
that has accumulated on this topic consists mostly of experimental studies, uses 
statistical analysis to evaluate relationships, and can be categorized into 
clusters of similar' independent and dependent variables. These characteristics 
permit a more systematic review and evaluation of impacts than has been done to 
date. In particular, recent advances in meta-analytic techniques, intended to 
integrate large numbers of experimental studies on a specialized topic, enable 
a reviewer to render a more precise evaluation of the strength of relationships 
obtained across a set of similar studies. 
Despite its shortcomings, primarily with regard to interpretation of the 
findings, the Blake and Mouton review makes clear that the experimental research 
on this topic has grown considerably over the past twenty years. Most of these 
studies focus on determinants of compromising behavior defined operationally in 
terms of whether an agreement is reached, how far each negotiator moved from his 
or her initial positions, and how long it took to get an agreement. Within each 
type of independent variable, we now have several experiments. By dividing the 
literature into clusters of similar independent and dependent variables, it is 
possible to combine studies for overall effect sizes. By comparing the effect 
sizes by "cluster," it is possible to evaluate the relative impact of each 
variable on compromising behavior. For example, effects obtained from several 
experiments in which the group representation variable is manipulated would be 
compared to effects obtained in experiments where other aspects of the situation, 
also hypothesized to influence negotiating behavior, were manipulated. If, as 
Blake and Mouton claim, the group representation variable is particularly 
important, it should produce a larger - - or the "largest" - - average effect size 
than those produced for the other variables. This comparison can be made with 
meta-analytic techniques. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a meta-analysis of 
published experimental studies on compromising behavior in negotiation. 
Procedures and detgiled information about the studies included in the analysis 
follows a more general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
technique. In addition to results about the rank-ordering of the variables in 
terms of effect size, an attempt is made to isolate the factors that distinguish 
between strong and weak effect sizes within each cluster of variables. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of implications for further research and 
methodological strategies. 
Meta-Analysis: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Early uses of meta-analysis are discussed by Glass et al. (1981). Their 
book was the first to give concrete suggestions for doing meta-analysis, using 
psychotherapy outcome research to illustrate various calculations and to explain 
how to interpret the findings. Following the publication of this book, many 
social scientists have used the technique to evaluate experimental findings on 
a number of topics. Examples include the Harris and Rosenthal (1985) evaluation 
of studies of expectancy effects, Feltz and Landers' (1983) analysis of mental 
practice effects, the Johnson and Johnson (1989) analysis of studies on 
cooperative learning, Freeberg and Rock's (1987) analysis of factors that 
influence the performance of work teams, and the very ambitious evaluation of 
randomized clinical trials in pregnancy and childbirth by Chalmers et al. (1989). 
These and many other applications provided the experience needed to refine the 
technique and develop the rationale for alternative procedures relevant to 
particular problems. Source books for applications include Light and Pillemer 
(1984), Rosenthal (1984), Wolf (1986), and Cooper (1989). A more mathematically 
sophisticated treatment of meta-analysis is provided by Hedges and Olkin (1985). 
These sources discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. 
Most generally, meta-analysis enables an investigator to combine the 
results from many studies designed to explore similar relationships between 
independent and dependent variables using a common metric to evaluate impacts. 
It also allows for direct comparison of the relative effects obtained on 
particular dependent variables from different independent variables. Meta- 
analysis is an operational approach to cumulation in science. The availability 
of procedures for judging effects over many studies encourages investigators to 
design studies that can serve as building blocks for a field or discipline. This 
has advantages both for theory-building and practice: By encouraging cumulation 
of evidence, meta-analysis provides strong falsification criteria for hypothesis- 
testing; it also insures that recommendations for practice are based on a body 
of documented evidence. The results of the analysis can also be used to 
construct models that link independent (e.g., time pressure), intervening (e.g., 
perceptions of the situation as cooperative or competitive), and dependent 
variables (e.g., a decision to reach a compromise agreement). [A good example 
of this kind of model construction is found in Freeberg and Rock's (1987) meta- 
analysis of the team-performance literature. ] Another advantage of the approach 
derives from the requirement of quality control. Studies included in the 
analysis should be adequate in terms of methodological criteria, i.e., effects 
should not be due to uncontrolled sources of variation. Thus. a reviewer must 
examine research designs and analysis procedures, distinguishing between 
relatively "high-qualityn and "low-quality" studies. Of course, all studies on 
a topic are not published and many articles may be overlooked. This being the 
case, the studies included in the analysis may only represent a small set of the 
universe of possible experiments on a topic. Fortunately, techniques have been 
developed to correct statistically for the missing studies, referred to as the 
"file-drawer" problem (Rosenthal, 1984). 
Although recent advances in meta-analysis have improved the technique, a 
number of weaknesses remain. One limitation is that effect sizes can only be 
computed for two-group comparisons; technically, for main-effect comparisons in 
which the numerator of the F-ratio is based on a single degree of freedom. Thus, 
important studies may be missed because three or more conditions were compared. 
Studies may also be missed because they do not report the appropriate statistics 
(t tests, F ratios, or chi-square) or these statistics cannot be computed from 
the raw data. Another weakness concerns the kinds of studies that are typically 
combined. Lacking precise replications, a reviewer is obliged to combine 
conceptually-similar, but not identical, definitions of independent and dependent 
variables. Included also in the computation of an average effect size are a 
mix of both high and low-quality research designs. Lacking in many of the 
experimental studies on negotiation is an exploration of dynamic relationships 
among variables. Changes in relationships over time within a negotiation and 
interactions among variables as they operate in different phases are not 
documented by the meta-analysis computations. Nor are those computations without 
some controversy. Statisticians are not in complete agreement about the most 
appropriate indicators of effect sizes. (See Wolf, 1986, for a discussion of 
alternative metrics.) 
Despite these limitations, however, the experimental negotiation literature 
provides many studies that meet the criteria for inclusion. Many consist of two- 
group comparisons on the variables of interest. A number of studies within the 
same independent-dependent variable category are near-replications, reducing the 
"apples-and-orangesn problem prevalent in other areas of research. And, most 
of the published experiments report appropriate statistics, making conversion 
to a correlation coefficient relatively easy. Moreover, the division of the 
literature matched our a vriori categorization of key independent and dependent 
variables. Within each of these categorizes we uncovered at least four studies 
that manipulated the variable of interest; for some studies, several independent 
comparisons could be included in the analysis. While no strict upper-limit of 
studies per category was adhered to, we were guided by the "file-drawer" 
criterion: our search for additional experiments stopped when it became clear 
that including more studies would not change the size of the effect sufficiently 
to render a significant result non-significant or vice versa. Similarly, on the 
dependent-variable side, we dropped variables used in fewer than four studies. 
Our interest was in measures of compromising behavior indicated by moves made 
during the process, by outcomes, by perceptions, or by stated intentions. The 
most frequently used indicators were various forms of yielding - -  concession- 
making, position change, willingness to compromise - -  and the speed with which 
the parties obtain a resolution of their differences. 
Studies Used in the Meta-Analysis 
The studies were divided among eight independent-dependent variable 
categories. The categories can be described in terms of the particular types 
of conditions being compared. Experiments on group representation consisted of 
a comparison of two types of negotiators, one representing a group to which he 
or she is accountable, the other representing only oneself. Prene~otiation 
experience consists of comparisons made between preparing strategies, usually 
with members of one's group, and studying the issues either with one's own or 
members of another group. By negotiator's orientation, we refer to the 
difference between generally competitive or cooperative views of the negotiating 
situation, Studies that manipulate visibilitv consist of comparisons between 
a condition where the negotiation process is observed by teammates or other 
onlookers and a condition in which the talks are private. The experiments that 
examine different opponent bargaining stratevies focus usually on the difference 
between relatively tough (few concessions) and soft (many concessions) postures. 
Two variations of issue size consisted of differences in initial position 
distance. often on a scale consisting of alternative compromise positions, and 
differences in the im~ortance of the issues,construed in terms of implications 
for various constituencies or in terms of the magnitude of incentives. Time 
pressure was manipulated in several experiments by comparing either deadlines 
with no deadlines or costs (vs. no costs) imposed for time spent negotiating. 
Impacts of each of these variables were assessed on various indices of vieldinq 
or compromisin~ behavior. For several variables, impacts on time to resolution 
were also analyzed. A complete listing of studies in each independent-dependent 
variable category is shown in Table 1. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Table 1 (P .  4 2 )  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
The sample of studies used in the analysis can be characterized in terms 
of several features. Practically all were published in refereed journals, 
assuring a certain degree of quality control: Only three appeared as either book 
chapters (Brandstatter et al., 1983; Druckman et al., 1977) or in a convention 
proceedings (Benton, 1972). The earliest study appeared in 1966 (Bass) while 
the most recent was published in 1991 (Druckman and Broome). Several studies 
explored the effects of more than one variable of interest (e.g., Organ, 1971; 
Love et al., 1983), thus appearing in more than one category, and a few reappear 
as independent comparisons of several experimental conditions or as more than 
one experiment reported in the same paper (e.g., Bass, 1966; Druckman, 1968). 
Most experiments were laboratory simulations of real-world bargaining problems 
reduced in size, scale, and time frame. Typically, an experiment proceeds in 
stages from an opening background briefing followed by a prenegotiation session 
consisting of learning and preparing for the upcoming talks, the negotiating 
process (including both debate and concession-making), and post-negotiation 
reactions including a debriefing; total time is usually no more than two hours. 
These similarities in paradigm ( research design, procedures and format) from 
one study to the next facilitate comparison and interpretation of results from ~ 
the 'meta-analysis . 1 
I 
Each study used in the analysis reported appropriate statistics - -  F I 
ratios, t-tests, or chi-square - -  for use in the meta-analysis. The reported 
statistic was transformed to a correlation coefficient according to formulae 
provided by Wolf (1986; see Table 8). Effect sizes for the separate studies in 
an independent-dependent variable category were averaged and a standard deviation 
was calculated for the set of correlations. The range of effect sizes for each 
category is also shown. Another combined statistical test is based on the 
conversion of probabilities associated with F or t ratios to z scores. The 
combined standard normal deviates (Z) and their associated probability levels I 
were obtained by the Stouffer method of adding'zs (Rosenthal, 1984; Wolf, 1986), 
using the following formula: 
where ZG is the standard normal deviate for the combined studies, Cz is the 
standard normal deviate for individual studies, and N is the number of studies. 
As noted above, however, these tests of the strength of the relationships are 
based only on the experiments included in the analysis. They do not take account 
of studies that do not meet the criteria for meta-analysis or are not reported. 
The effect of missing studies is gauged by using the fail-safe N formula given 
by Wolf as follows: 
where CZ is the sum of individual Z scores and N is the number of studies 
combined for the computation of an effect size. The result of this computation 
is interpreted as the number of additional studies in a meta-analysis needed to 
reverse the overall probability obtained from a combined test to a value higher 
than, in this case, the .O1 level for statistical significance. 
Results 
This section is divided into three parts. Effect sizes (ES) and related 
statistics for the studies in each independent-dependent variable (IV-DV) 
category are reported in the first part. The second part consists of a 
discussion of procedural differences between the strongest and weakest ES 
experiments in each category. These are variables that may account for the 
different findings. A comparison of results obtained from a simulation in which 
several variables are combined in scenarios with the meta-analysis results is 
discussed in the third part of this section. These are two approaches to 
synthesis. The simulation combines effects of several variables operating 
simultaneously in a situation. The meta-analysis combines results from several 
experiments that analyze the effects of one variable at a time. 
Effect Sizes 
All of the studies used in the analysis are summarized in Table 1. They 
are grouped under IV-DV category where information about authors, dates, and 
Journal are recorded. Relevant information used for calculating an effect size. 
is also shown. This includes the experimental conditions being compared, the 
statistical ratio that evaluates the comparison, its associated degrees of 
freedom, and the conversion of these statistics to an ES expressed as a 
correlation coefficient. Several items in this table require explanation. 
Negative statistical ratios and effect sizes indicate that the result was in the 
opposite direction predicted by the hypothesis being tested, for example, non- 
representative~ were more competitive than representative~. A number of studies 
reported more than one effect size for a particular comparison. In these 
experiments, the,investigators developed several indicators of the dependent 
variable, for example, perceptual, process, and outcomes indicators of yielding 
from initial positions. For these studies, an average ES was calculated and used 
in the meta-analysis. As was noted above, some papers appear several times 
within an IV-DV category; this is because several independent experiments were 
reported in the paper or independent comparisons of alternative conditions were 
made. The condition comparisons are described only in general terms. For more 
details on procedures, the reader is advised to consult the article. 
Average effect sizes are shown in Table 2 for the impacts of each 
independent variabre on measures of yielding. Also included in the table are 
the variation and range of ES for the studies in the category, tests of 
significance and associated probability levels, and the results of the fail - 
safe N computation. The same types of information are shown in Table 3 for the 
measure of time to resolution. Effect sizes for yielding range from a high of 
.39 (prenegotiation experience, negotiator's orientation) to a low of .13 (large 
vs. small issues). Effect sizes for the measure of time to resolution range from 
.43 (time pressure) to .26 (representation). A general distinction can be made 
between relatively strong and weak independent variables. Only small differences 
occurred among the ES of prenegotiation experience, orientation, position 
distance, time pressure, and opponent's strategy. Similarly, small differences 
appear among the weaker variables - -  visibility, representation, and large vs. 
small issues. Representation is also relatively weak in relation to the impact 
'of the other variables on time to resolution1. The relatively small effect size 
on yielding for the representation variable may be due, in part, to a negative 
ES obtained in the study by Ben-Yoav and Pruitt (1984b; see Table 1). The impact 
of this study on the overall ES is shown in Table 2. Numbers in parenthesis are 
the recomputed statistics, excluding the Ben-Yoav and Pruitt ES. The 
recalculated ES increases from .24 to .30, which changes the rank order of this 
variable one position - -  from seventh to sixth. Similarly, excluding the 
negative ES on time to resolution obtained from the Hermann and Kogan study 
(1968; see Table 1) increases the average ES from .26 to .31but does not change 
the rank order of the representation variable. And, when the negative ES obtained . 
in the Rozelle and Druckman study (1971b; see Table 1) is dropped from the 
analysis of large vs. small issues, the average ES increases from .13 to .20 but 
the rank order of the variable remains the same. 
Tables 2 and 3 (pp.53-54) 
The significance tests and fail safe N computations indicate that the 
obtained ES for most variables are quite strong. Despite the small number of 
studies in some categories, a large number of additional studies would be needed 
to reverse the overall probability obtained from the combined tests of 
significance: Over 50 additional studies would be needed for the variables of 
prenegotiation experience, orientation, and position distance. Only the variable 
of large vs. small issues produces a non-significant ES, a relationship that can 
be reversed by including additional studies. 
The magnitudes of these ES can be understood in relation to ES obtained 
in meta- analyses conducted in other areas of research. Two earlier meta- 
analyses are on topics similar to research on negotiation, namely, team 
performance and goal structures in learning groups. Freeberg and Rock's (1987) 
analysis of determinants of several indicators of team performance produced 
effect sizes of .36 (accuracy), .35 (solution time), .40 (product quality), and 
. .25 (task proficiency). The Johnson et al. (1981) analysis of the effects of 
different goal structures on achievement resulted in an average ES of .41 with 
the ES for the various experimental comparisons (among competitive, cooperative,. 
and individualistic goal structures) ranging from a high of .78 to a low of 0. 
The meta-analyses conducted by Harris and Rosenthal (1985) on expectancy effects 
produced ES that ranged from .11 to .29 on various behavior categories, from - 
.44 to .48 on mediating variables, and from .07 to .35 on factors related to 
outcomes. Somewhat further removed from negotiating behavior are the analyses 
conducted by Feltz and Landers (1983) on mental-practice effects and by Jacobs 
et al. (1990) on flight simulator training research. The former analysis showed 
an average ES of .48 for the effects of mental practice (without physical 
practice) on performance; the combined mental-physical practice condition raised 
the average ES to .62, although the McCullagh et al. (1990) study reported an 
ES of .42 for a combination of Sybervision (a type of mental practice) and 
physical practice. The latter analysis reported an overall average ES of .26. 
The average ES obtained in this study are stronger than those obtained in the 
team performance, expectancy effect, and flight simulator training analyses but 
somewhat weaker than those obtained for the effects of mental practice and 
cooperative learning. 
Differences Between Strong and Weak Effect Size Studies 
The experiments that produced the largest and smallest ES for each IV 
category are shown in Table 4. By comparing the procedures used in these 
studies, it may be possible to ascertain the aspects of those procedures that 
account for the different results. These variables, then, are the basis for 
anothoer generation of experiments on the situational determinants of bargaining 
behavior. The key procedural differences are summarized by IV-DV category. 
Table 4 (p .55)  
yield in^ bv re~resentatives, The strongest ES were obtained in the studies 
by Druckman et al. (1972) and Hermann and Kogan (1968). Yoav and Pruitt' s (1984) 
finding of more competitive non-representatives resulted in a negative ES while 
the Druckman (1967) study produced a non-significant difference between a 
representation and non-representation condition. Several differences in 
procedure existed between the two types of studies. The representative's 
teammates were present during the bargaining in the Druckman et al. (1972) 
experiments but not in Druckman (1967) or in Yoav and Pruitt (1984). The 
hierarchical relationship between delegates and leaders in the Hermann and Kogan 
study combined with an option that provided a "solution" to the delegate's 
boundary-role dilemma (to reach an agreement without compromising "too much") 
to produce a relatively strong ES. These conditions did not exist in the studies 
that produced weaker ES. In the Druckman study the representatives were nos 
accountable to "superiors;" in the Yoav and Pruitt study, representatives 
bargained under a cooperative orientation leading them to yield in order to 
attain settlements. Thus, representatives may be less willing to compromise when 
their teammates are present during the bargaining, when there is a hierarchical 
relationship between the delegate and his or her "superiors," when there is no 
salient solution that allows the to resolve theirboundary-role dilemma, andwhen 
one's orientation toward the bargaining task is competitive. 
Time to resolution bv representatives, Whereas the Hermann and Kogan 
(1968) manipulation produced a strong ES on yielding, the same condition 
comparison resulted in a weak ES on the time measure. Both delegates and leaders 
needed about the same amount of time to resolve their differences. However, more 
variation was obtained for the delegate than for the leader groups: delegates 
had either short or long negotiations while leaders fell in the middle of the 
time distribution. Delegates who took longer were those who were less satisfied 
with their leaders, less committed to their internal decisions, and less 
satisfied with the resulting intergroup decisions. Differences among 
representatives are highlighted by this finding. Especially interesting is the 
role played by the relationship between delegates and leaders; an unsatisfactory 
relationship may prolong negotiations even when the same compromises are reached 
as outcomes for both short and long negotiations. 
Yieldine due to prene~otiation experience, Contrasting ES were found for 
the Druckman (1968) study, on the one hand, and for the Druckman (1967) and Bass 
(1966) studies on the other. The primary difference between Druckman's studies 
is the way that the unilateral strategy condition was created. The 1967 study 
was more ambieuous about the specific means by which strategies were to be 
prepared; the 1968 study was more precise in communicating how formal positions 
were to be prepared. Three dimensions of difference were found between the Bass 
and 1968 Druckman studies. Bass used more issues (9 versus 4), did not employ 
a deadline, and noted a suspicion that some unilateral study groups were actually 
developing strategies. Each of these aspects of the situation may have reduced 
the size of the impact of strategizing versus studying the issues by reducing 
the salience of the manipulation. More issues increase the complexity of the 
task; preparation may interact with time pressure due to study-condition subjects 
yielding more under deadlines, and a lack of clarity in the instructions about 
how to prepare - -  in both the Bass and 1967 Druckman studies - -  may increase the 
variation among groups in the same condition. 
Time to resolution due to ~rene~otiation experience, Contrasting ES were 
obtained by the Bass (1966) and Klimoski (1972) experiments. Study-condition 
subjects took as long to reach agreement as did strategy-condition subjects in 
Klimoski's study. A difference between strategy and study groups, found in other 
studies (e.g., Druckman, 1968) is that strategy groups tend to be more cohesive 
than study groups. Klimoski's manipulation may have induced comparable levels 
of cohesiveness in both conditions. A cohesive studv group may indeed take as 
long to complete negotiations as a cohesive strateey group 
Yielding - bv negotiator's orientation. The strong ES obtained in Organ's 
(1971) study is contrasted to the weak ES found in Druckman's (1967) study. This 
may be accounted for by three differences in procedures. While Organ induced 
an orientation through direct-communications from teammates to representatives 
just before the negotiation, Druckman selected subjects on the basis of self- 
reported orientations assessed sometime before the negotiation. In Organ's 
study, but not in Druckmans', the orientation (either cooperative or competitive) 
was linked to a negotiating strategy. And, in Organ's study, the preferred 
orientation was communicated to negotiators from constituents located "above" 
the negotiators in the simulated organizational structure. The relationship 
between negotiators and teammates in Druckman's study was not hierarchical. 
Yieldine under visibilitv or constituent surveillance. Face-saving 
pressures were instituted in the Brown (1970) and Druckman and Rozelle (1975) 
studies. In both studies, subjects compromised less when "performing" before 
an audience of constituents than when no audience was present during 
negotiations. For Brown, the pressures were strong - -  they were asked to 
describe embarrassing feelings before an audience - -  and material costs were 
levied for deviation from instructions. Druckman and Rozelle's procedure 
consisted of having subjects defend a counter-attitudinal position before an 
audience. Material costs associated with performance were not at stake and 
commitment to posieions being defended was relatively low. 
Yieldine bv opponent's strategy. The key difference between the Gruder 
(1971) and Brandstatter et al. (1983) experiments was the clarity of the other's 
strategy.. Gruder's subjects attributed cooperative or exploitative intentions 
to their opponents based on the actual moves made during bargaining. Subjects 
in the Brandstatter et al. study reacted to a liked or disliked opponent that 
they "regarded" as being either soft or tough bargainers. This indirect 
manipulation of the other's strategy may have been the reason for the small ES 
obtained in that study. 
Yielding bv initial ~osition distance. Contrasting ES were obtained for 
the two Rappoport studies. The key difference between them was the way that 
.positions were created. Subjects in his 1965 study acquired positions through 
laboratory training, construed as either large or small "cue-discrepancies . " 
Those in the 1969 study brought their positions (previously assessed by attitude 
scales) on particular social issues to the laboratory. This difference between 
the studies on subjects' commitment to their positions may have accounted for 
the large ES in the 1969 study and the small ES in the 1965 study. Similarly, 
the small ES obtained in Druckman and Rozelle's 1975 study can be understood in 
terms of position commitment. Subjects in that study were asked to defend a 
counter-attitudinalposition inboth conditions, one in which initial differences 
were relatively large and the other where the distance between positions was 
small. 
Yieldine and time to resolution on larne vs, small issues. For both 
measures, contrasting ES were obtained for the Druckman et al. (1988) and Love 
et al. (1983) experiments. In the former study, positions were either linked 
explicitly to broad ideologies (large issues) or were not so linked (small 
issues). In the latter study, large or small issues were created by conditions 
in which factions within teams were either unified or split on the ideological 
issues. The role of ideology was defined differently in the two experiments: 
For Druckman et al., the comparison was between explicit or implicit differences 
in underlying ideologies; for Love and her associates, the comparison was made 
between competing teams that had relatively extreme or moderate ideological 
differences. The impact of this variable was stronger for an ideology vs. "no 
ideology" comparison than for a comparison of larger vs. smaller differences in 
ideological issues. Both of these studies were role-playing simulations of 
social conflicts. The negative ES obtained in the Rozelle and Druckman (1971) 
experiment raises questions about the effects of role-playing procedures on 
negotiating behavior. They found more yielding from initial positions on a 
central (large) issue than on a peripheral (small) issue in a non-role-playing 
condition; the opposite finding was obtained for their role-playing condition 
(see the ES in Table 1). Further probes of this issue may be illuminating2. 
Yieldine - under time pressure. The range of ES for time pressure is 
relatively small. The strongest ES of .54, obtained by Smith et al. (1982), is 
contrasted to the weakest ES of .27 found in both the Yukl et al. (1976) and 
Hamner (1974) studies. Subjects in the different studies may have responded in 
similar ways to the presence or absence of time pressure: They yielded more 
(less) when pressured (not pressured) to reach an agreement. Yet, despite the 
apparent similarities in response, there are some differences among the studies 
worth noting. The short time limits (45 vs. 90 seconds) used by Smith and his 
associates may have combined with payoffs based on earnings to produce strong 
effects on willingness to compromise. All subjects in the Yukl et al. study 
negotiated for a period of 30 minutes and were told that they would not be 
competing directly against their opponent for a monetary reward. (In the high 
time pressure condition, subjects lost "additional points" given them before 
bargaining, one for each minute spent bargaining.) Similarly, Hamner compared 
a 20-trial limit (low pressure) with a 30-trial limit (high pressure). However, 
like Smith et al., Hamner paid subjects according to their earnings. 
Time to resolution under time pressure. Time pressure exerts its strongest 
effects on time to resolution. All studies reviewed found quicker agreements 
when subjects bargained under a deadline (see Table 1). The somewhat smaller 
ES obtained in the Komorita and Barnes (1969) study may have been due to the 
arbitrary assignment of a score for non-agreers, namely 13 for a 12-trial 
deadline. This artificial ceiling may have reduced the between-condition 
variation in time to agreement. It may have also suppressed the mean number of 
trials to agreement for subjects in the low-pressure condition3. 
The procedural differences described above are additional variables 
hypothesized to affect compromising behavior. They may interact with the 
variables examined in the meta-analysis in producing effects. For example, 
representation effects are stronger when the relationship between the 
representative andhis or her constituents is hierarchical (atwo-way interaction 
between the variables). It is also stronger when the representatives approach 
negotiation with a competitive orientation (three way interaction between 
representation, type of relationship, and orientation). These are hypothesized 
interaction effects to be investigated in further experiments. 
Combining Variables in a Simulation: Relative Impacts 
The meta-analysis is limited to comparing effects of variables taken one 
at a time. Effect sizes are computed from main effects obtained in experiments 
that manipulate a small number of variables, usually two or three. Of interest 
is the question of whether larger ES would be obtained from experiments that 
examine the impact of these variables in combination, not as interactions but 
as main effects from the combined impact of several situational variables 
operating simultaneously. Combined impacts were analyzed in a recent study, 
making it possible to compare the obtained ES with those from the meta-analysis. 
Details on procedures and results are presented in Druckman (1993). Only 
procedures relevant to the comparisons of interest are summarized here. 
Participants played roles of "delegates" to a simulated conference in which 
they would negotiate over establishing an international commission to regulate 
standards about industrial emissions. The conference was divided into four 
stages, each defined by a scenario in which several variables were embedded. 
Six of the eight variables analyzed in the meta-analysis were included in the 
stage scenarios; an additional ten variables, not analyzed in the meta-analysis, 
were also included. Three experimental conditions were compared: one designed 
to induce compromise from initial positions (condition A ) ,  another designed to 
prevent compromise (condition B), and a third in which few compromises would be 
made in the early stages with more compromises in a final endgame stage 
(condition C). In the first stage, for example, (referred to as prenegotiation 
planning), delegates were told that their positions were either not linked 
(condition A ) or linked (conditions B and C) to national ideologies, that they 
were either an advisor to the delegation (A) or the primary representative (B 
and C), that they were either to study the issues (A) or strategize (B and C), 
and that they were familiar (A) or unfamiliar (B and C) with the positions 
developed by the other delegations. In the final endgame stage, there was either 
a deadline (conditions A and C) or no deadline (B), there was light (A and C) 
or heavy (B) media coverage, the delegate had either an attractive (A and C) or 
unattractive (B) alternative to a negotiated agreement, and there was either a 
proposed mediator-derived solution (A and C) or no such solution (B). Condition 
differences on measures of compromise were analyzed across and within stages; 
a 3 (conditions) x 4 (stages) ANOVA design with stages as a repeated measure. 
The experiment was replicated with two samples, scientists with knowledge of the 
issues and diplomats with experience in international negotiation. The F-ratios 
computed on each dependent variable were converted to ES for comparison with the 
results of the meta-analysis, both across and within stages. 
Effect sizes for the condition A and B comparisons on yielding and time 
to resolution are shown in Table 5 for each sample and for both samples combined. 
An average ES from the meta-analysis, calculated for the 70 comparisons (across 
the variables) made on yielding and the 26 comparisons made on time to 
resolution, is also shown in the table. A third dependent variable shown in the 
table is perceptions of the situation as being competitive (win-lose) or 
cooperative (problem-solving). However, since only a few earlier studies 
included this variable, it was not analyzed in the meta-analysis. A combined- 
sample ES on yielding of .59 compares to an average ES of .31 from the meta- 
analysis; a difference of .28 between the simulation and meta-analysis results. 
These are two types of main effects. One combines several variables within a 
condition; the other combines many studies, each analyzing the effects of the 
variables taken one at a time. The impacts on compromising behavior are 
considerably stronger for the former combination procedure than for the latter. 
Table 5 (p .57)  
Effect sizes are compared for the scientist sample in the simulation and 
meta-analysis by stage in Table 6. The average ES calculated by stage for the 
meta-analysis comparisons include only those variables contained within the stage 
scenarios: For example, representation, prenegotiation experience, and large vs. 
small issues for stage I; time pressure and visibility for stage IV. Impacts 
of the combined variables on yielding in the simulation are stronger than the 
combined results of the studies used in the meta-analysis; differences by stage 
of .12, .12, .28, and .21 respectively. The differences are especially large 
for the later stages I11 (the give-and-take) and IV (the endgame) of the 
simulation. 
Table 6 ( P - 5 8 )  
A more direct comparison of simulation and meta-analysis results entails 
isolating the separate effects of the variables included in each stage of the 
simulation, An attempt was made to do this by asking participants to make pair 
comparisons among the variables included in each stage. Analysis of these 
judgments resulted in weights for the variables being compared. (See Guilford, 
1954, for a description of the technique; see Druckman, 1993, for the results.) 
Four variables examined in the meta-analysis proved important in the judgments 
of simulation participants regarding what made them more or less flexible. 
Whether media coverage was wide or limited was judged as being particularly 
important in decistons made during the later stages. This variable is similar 
to the manipulation of visibility in the experiments reviewed above; visibility 
produced a modest ES of .28 in the meta-analysis. While being a delegate- 
advisor induced compromise in the simulation, being the primary representative 
was not judged as being an important determinant of decisions. Representation 
effects produced a relatively weak ES in the meta-analysis. Strategy preparation 
was judged to reduce compromises in the simulation just as studying the issues 
had some, more modest, influence on inducing movement. Prenegotiation experience 
produced the strongest ES in the meta-analysis. And, simulation participants 
reacted to tough opponents with flexibility in contrast to the relatively 
inflexible decisions made by them in reaction to softer opponents; the opponent's 
strategy variable produced a moderate ES in the meta-analysis. The other 
variables included in both analyses - -  large or small issues and time pressure - 
- were judged as being relatively weak influences on decisions to compromise in 
the simulation. Similarly, large or small issues produced a very weak ES on 
yielding in the meta-analysis. Time pressure, on the other hand, had stronger 
effects in the meta-analysis on both yielding and time to resolution. 
Discussion 
The results have implications for theoretical work on compromising behavior 
in negotiation. They address, in particular, the relative effects of various 
aspects of the negotiating situation on the willingness to move from initial 
positions to achieve agreements. These aspects are those shown in earlier 
experiments to influence bargaining behavior. The findings contribute to the 
literature in several ways, addressing "old" issues and paving the way for new 
research. By combining findings from different experiments, the meta-analysis 
could distinguish relatively important from unimportant variables as they 
operated across studies. Such cumulation enabled us to address the argument 
that inflexibility in bargaining is due largely to pressures on group 
representatives to adopt tough postures. While the analysis was limited to main 
effects, it was possible to suggest possible interactions from comparisons 
between strong and weak ES studies within a variable category. However, the 
effect sizes obtained for these experiments were shown to underestimate the size 
of effects likely to obtain when the variables operate together as may well be 
the case in a variety of real-world settings. Each of these findings is 
discussed in turn followed by suggestions for next steps. 
The results address the issue of single-factor explanations for bargaining 
behavior. They challenge Blake and Mouton's (1989) assertion that group 
representation is the most important determinant of competitive behavior during 
bargaining. In fact, the average ES for this variable was considerably weaker 
than those obtained for the other variables in the analysis. Other aspects 
of the situation, unrelated to a bargainer's role, had stronger impacts on 
. compromising behavior. However, the results also suggest that "role effects" 
can be enhanced by highlighting certain aspects of the role or by combining it 
with other features of the situation. One aspect is the relationship between 
the bargaining representative and the parties being represented: A hierarchical 
relationship decreases a representative's willingness to compromise. Two parts 
of the relationship between a representative and his or her constituents are 
decision latitude and accountability. Hierarchical relationships are 
characterized by reduced latitude and high accountability. Other features of 
the situation shorn to enhance representation effects are the presence of 
teammates during bargaining, the lack of a salient solution to the bargaining 
problem, and a competitive orientation toward the bargaining task. These are 
variables that interact with role in producing effects on bargaining behavior. 
Two of these variables are among those included in this analysis, namely, 
visibility and orientation. 
A number of other possible interactions are suggested by the comparisons 
between experiments that produced strong and weak ES in each category. For all 
the variables examined, stronger effects were obtained in studies that defined 
the contrasting experimental conditions clearly, highlighting the key dimensions 
of difference between the conditions. Examples are studies where a clear 
distinction was made between the representative and non-representative roles, 
where the unilateral study condition did not allow for some strategy planning, 
where an opponent's actual offers defined his or her strategy (rather than 
scripted information), and where neither an artificial ceiling of trials nor long 
time limits were used to define time pressures. For many of the variables, 
stronger effects were obtained when other conditions were present. Following 
strategy preparation, bargainers were considerably more competitive when there 
were fewer issues in contention, deadline pressures, and they were part of 
cohesive teams. Competitive bargaining orientations were enhanced when they were 
communicated (or induced) during the bargaining process by bureaucratic 
"superiors." The orientations also had a stronger impact on behavior when they 
were linked directly to negotiating strategies. When face-saving concerns were 
aroused by visible negotiations, bargainers were more competitive. They were 
also more competitive when their initial positions were derived from long-held 
social or political attitudes and when those positions had implications for 
broader ideologies. And, time pressure was more likely to induce compromise when 
actual payoffs to bargainers depended on earnings in a competitively-defined 
task. 
These results provide answers to the question, when do bargainers stick 
to their positions? Seven answers are offered as follows: 
1) When they are representatives accountable to bureaucratic actors at 
"higher" levels who communicate a competitive approach during the talks at which 
they or other constituents are present; 
2) when they prepare strategies in cohesive groups for a negotiatio~ 
in which few issues are being contested and a deadline exists; 
3) when relatively competitive orientations are induced during the 
bargaining by bureaucratic "superiors" and linked explicitly to bargaining 
strategies; 
4) when they perform before an audience that creates face-saving 
pressures; 
5) when the differences between positions are derived from long-held 
social attitudes and/or are linked to contrasting ideologies made explicit in 
the negotiating materials; 
6) when there are no (or weak) time limits to reach agreement and no 
"strike costsn while the bargaining takes place, and 
7) when they are faced with a tough or exploitative opponent and his 
or her "toughnessn is easy to discern. 
These are the conditions for intransigence. They are the aspects of a situation 
that can be manipulated as part of a tactical approach to negotiating beneficial 
agreements. As such, the factors can also be'used as a checklist for diagnosing 
particular cases in terms of the likelihood that an agreement will occur. 
Whether the expected effects on bargaining result from each variable taken singly 
or from particular combinations of these variables remains to be studied. 
The comparisons made between strong and weak ES studies call attention to 
the several ways in which variables may combine to produce effects on bargaining 
behavior. One consists of "procedural enhancements" to the key independent 
variables. Examples are specifyinghierarchical relationships betweenbargaining 
representatives and their constituents or agencies. inducing face-saving 
pressures as part of the visibility manipulation, enhancing commitment to the 
positions taken by opposing bargainers, and insuring that the other's bargaining 
strategy is easy to discern. These effects result from the way a variable is 
operationalized in a particular study. Another type of combinination consists 
of interactions between different variables. Examples are the effects of 
competitive orientations or the existence of salient solutions on a 
representative's behavior, of the way that time pressure or number of issues 
influences the impact of strategy preparation, and the effects of orientation 
in hierarchical versus non-hierarchical situations. A third type of combined 
effect is when the IV-DV relationship is mediated by a third variable. Examples 
of such intervening variables are the bargaining-team cohesion produced by 
prenegotiation strategy preparation or by making the contrasting ideological 
orientations underlying bargaining positions explicit. Another example is when 
cooperative or competitive orientations toward the bargaining task are linked 
to a strategy that leads to agreements or deadlocks. Each of these combined 
effects remains to be demonstrated. Less conjectural are the relative impacts 
on bargaining of combining variables versus examining them one at a time. 
The comparisons made between the meta-analysis and simulation results are 
instructive. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the differences were quite substantial, 
showing that combined effects are stronger than effects obtained from each 
variable manipulated separately. Comparable differences were obtained across 
and within the stages of the simulated negotiation (see Tables 5 and 6). These 
differences may also reflect the distinction between laboratory bargaining and 
real-world negotiations. Effects obtained in controlled laboratory experiments 
may underestimate impacts of similar variables that influence negotiating 
decisions made in situ. Less is known, however, about the way that these 
variables interact in producing effects. 
Further information is provided by comparing the weights produced for those 
variables represented in both analyses. Similar results were obtained for both 
the strongest and weakest variables in the meta-analysis. Prenegotiation 
preparation had strong effects in both analyses: it yielded the strongest ES in 
the meta-analysis and was among the strongest variables judged to influence 
decisions about flexibility in the simulation. Representation and issue size 
produced relatively weak effects in both analyses; however, while the role of 
representative produced negligible effects in the simulation, the contrasting 
role of delegate-adviser was judged to influence flexibility in the simulation. 
Such convergent findings attest, in part, to the generality of the findings for 
these variables. Less general, however, are the effects produced by other 
variables examined in both analyses. While media exposure was a stronger 
influence in the simulation than visibility was in the experiments, time pressure 
had a stronger impact in the experiments than in the simulation. These 
differences may be due to context. Open versus secret deliberations has long 
been regarded an important influence on the behavior of international 
negotiators. For them. "...the same compromises arrived at secretly may not look 
nearly as bad as iS arrived at openly . . .  neither party expects concessions in 
formal public conferences . . . "  (Druckman, 1973: 45). Visibility for laboratory 
bargainers would seem to have fewer implications for their outcomes. Time 
pressure, on the other hand, may be more compelling in laboratory tasks where 
short-term payoffs rather than long-term relationships and side effects are at 
issue. 
The sampling of bargaining experiments included in the meta-analysis makes 
apparent the cumulative feature of research on this topic. New experimental 
results can be added within each category as they become available. The new 
results may lead to adjusted average effect sizes. They are unlikely, however, 
to overturn the significance levels obtained with the current samples as 
indicated by the fail-safe N computations. New categories of variables can also 
be added. A number of variables are central in theorizing about negotiation but 
'have received scant attention in the experimental work to date. These include 
the influence of power differences among the parties (Beriker, 1992), the roles 
played by third parties (Zubek et al., 1992), issues of relationship between the 
parties (Azar and Burton, 1986), the impact of the number of parties or the 
complexity of the issues (Druckman and Hopmann, 1989; Winham, 1977), the 
difference betweenhaving attractive or unattractive alternatives to a negotiated 
agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Thibaut, 1968), and the role played by 
conference format and agendas, including the issue of simultaneous versus 
sequential consideration of the issues (Pruitt , 1981 ; Cohen et a1 . , 1978)4. 
Further experiments designed to explore effects of these and related variables 
would expand the meta-analytic menu, resulting in an increased number of ES 
comparisons. On the dependent variable side, investigators should be encouraged 
to include a greater variety of perceptual indices in their measurement package. 
Guided by a checklist of DVs to include in any study, investigators would 
contribute data that enable meta-analysts to construct path models that highlight 
the roles played by intervening perceptions. (See Freeberg and Rock's, 1987, 
examples of "mini-models.") 
Finally, other distinctions among the studies can be used as bases for 
comparison. One distinction is between those studies characterized by strong 
as opposed to weak experimental designs: Is there a difference in ES between the 
strong and weak studies within each IV category? Another is the difference among 
settings as laboratory, simulation, or field studies: Are the stronger ES found 
for the more tightly-controlled laboratory studies? And, a third distinction is 
between the earlier andmore-recent investigations: Are stronger effects produced 
in the newer generation of experiments? These and other dimensions for 
comparison call attention to the impacts of methodology on results. These 
comparisons would be facilitated by a larger sampling of studies within each 
independent-dependent variable category. 
FOOTNOTES 
Author's Note: Much of the work on this analysis was done while I was a 
visiting Research Scholar with the Processes of International Negotiation 
Project (PIN) at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria. Gratitude is extended to Bert Spector, Leader of the PIN 
project, for facilitating this work. Special thanks go to Xianghong Wang for 
her contributions to the analyses of strong and weak effect-size experiments 
and to James Druckman for his assistance in performing the statistical 
computations required for the meta-analysis. 
1. Tests of significance based on the z-statistic are not diagnostic of 
differences between means due to the small number of studies in each category. 
2. The negative ES obtained in this study accounts, in large part, for the 
small overall ES shown for the large vs. small issue variable. This is due 
to the relatively small number of studies that investigated the effects of 
this variable (see Tables 2 and 3). 
3. Another difference between the procedures used in the two studies (Hamner; 
Komorita and Barnes) was the information about the other's costs was known by 
Komorita and Barnes' subjects but not by the subject in Hamner's study. It 
is, however, unclear how this procedural difference relates to the effects of 
time pressure. 
4. Several of these variables were included in the simulation scenarios: 
relative power of the parties, mediation, attractiveness of alternatives, 
conference format, and agenda decisions about seeking comprehensive or partial 
agreements. Experimental evidence is beginning to accumulate on the effects 
of power differences and mediation. 
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Representing a laboratory 
teem versus oneself 
Constituency evaluation 
versus no constituency 
evaluation of performance 
Accountable to e teammate 
versus not accountable 
Representing assigned 
positions from teem versus 
own position 
Represent simulated 





Accountable versus non- 
accountable bargainers 
Represent a laboratory teem 
versus oneself 
Negotiation (representation) 
versus discussion (non- 
representation) groups 
Representative is accountable 
or not accountable to 
constituents 
Representing a laboratory 
teem versus oneself 
F = 4.86 
F = 4.68 
F = 4.90 
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F = .259 
t = 1.81 
F = 5.30 
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F = 5.72 
F = 7.1 2 
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Exploitative vesus cooperative 
perceptions of opponent 
Communication set as 
"justifiers' versus 
"persuaders" 
Constituent's orientation as 
competitive or cooperative 
Representative's bargaining 






An evaluative versus a non- 
evaluative audience 
Watched or not watched by 
constituents 
T earn members observe the 
debate and give feedback on 
performance versus debate in 
privacy 
With or without teammates' 
visual access to negotiation 
F = 20.38 
F = 7.47 
F = .83 
F = 4.94 
F = 24.21 
F = 1 7 . 5 2  
F = 5.34 
F = 9.30 
F = 6.10 
F = 2.20 
F = 5.13 
X = 4.48 
F = 4.61 
F = 10.80 
F = 8.41 
F = 13.38 
F = 3.48 
F = 5.68 
F = 6.90 
F = 4.10 
F = 10.10 
F = 10.33 
F = 4.82 
F = 6.90 
F = 4.73 
F = 6.32 
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Constituent surveillance of 
negotiation 
Opponent as expolitative or 
fair 
Opponent becomes 
increasingly tough or soft 
Soft end fair versus tough 
opponent 
Other's concession magnitude 
as large or smell 
Other's concession frequency 
as frequent or infrequent 
Opponent's concession rate 
as increasinly tough or 
increasingly soft 
Tough or soft opponent 
Opponent proposes 
compromises from initial 
positions or does not propose 
compromises 
Size of conflict as a narrow or 
wide range of points to be 
distributed 
Size of conflict as 
attractiveness of external 
alternative (BATNA) 
F = 6.67 
F = 5.94 
F = 35.75 
F= 10.80 
F = 4.51 
F = 2.73 
F = 8.3 1 
F = 11.77 
F = 7.42 
F = 7.78 
F = 14.72 
F = 2.33 
F = 3.42 
F = 11.24 
F = 12.24 
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Small versus lerge cue 
discrepancies in e cognitive 
conflict task 
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Hemner 
Vukl, Malone, 
Hayslip, and Pamin 


















20 trials end 5% penalty for 
each additional trial (high 
pressure) versus 30 trials and 
no penalty (low pressure) 
Points lost for aach minute 
teken to reech agreement 
versus no points lost 
45 seconds versus 90 
seconds to complete 
negotiation 
$2 cost imposed per trial 
versus no trial costs imposed 
(ceiling of 12 trials) 
Acute versus mild time 
pressure defined by the 
chance that the negotiation 
would end early (few offers) 
or late (many offers) 
20 trials and 5% penalty for 
each additional trial (high 
pressure) versus 30 trials and 
no penalty (low pressure) 
Points lost for each minute 
taken to reach agreement 
versus no points lost 
45 seconds versus 90 
seconds to complete 
negotiations 
F = 61.93 
F = 15.40 
F = 3.90 
F = 8.27 
F = 4.95 
F = 2.82 
F = 4.42 
F = 2.18 
F = 19.11 
F = 19.42 
F = 16.80 
F = . I29 
F = 28.43 
F = 4.13 
F = 44.60 
F = 1 7 . 4 0  







































1986 JCR A very brief amount of time to 
negotiate--5 minutes plus 
reminded about time 
remaining every minute--(high 
pressure) versus a very large 
amount of time to negotiate- 
25 minutes plus reminded 
about time remaining every 5 
minutes--(low pressure) 
F = 6.56 
F = 3.03 
F = 2.86 
F = 6.1 4 
F = 4.10 
F = 6.22 




















Time to Resolution 
by Representatives 
Table 4 
Strongest and Weakest Effect Size Studies in Each Category 
Strongest ES . . Weakest ES 
Druckman et al. (1972) Yoav and Pruitt (1984) 
-53 (I), -39 (11) -.46 
Hermann and Kogan (1968) Druckman (1967) 
.39 .05 
Druckman et al. (1972) Hermann and Kogan (1968) 
.56 -. 10 
Yielding by Prenegotiation 
Experience Druckman (1968) 
-48 (I), -48 (11) 
Time to Resolution by 
Prenegotiation Experience 
Yielding by Negotiator's 
Orientation 

















Druckman and Rozelle (1 975) 
.18 
Yielding by Opponent's 
Strategy 
Yielding by Initial 
Position Distance 
Yielding on Large or 
Small Issues 
Time to Resolution on 
Large or Small Issues 
Yielding under Time 
Pressure 
Time to Resolution 
under Time Pressure 








Druckman and Rozelle (1975) 
.10 
Druckman et al. (1988) Love et al. (1983) 
.40 .06 
Rozelle and Druckrnan (1971) 
-.30 
Druckman et al. (1988) Love et al. (1983) 
.68 .09 






Komorita and Barnes (1969) 
.30 


